It’s all about “Counter-insurgency!”
Tuesday 10th April
Having spent the last few weeks planning and buying my equipment and supplies, I spent last night packing it all away, throwing out anything I could to lighten the load. After all, I have to carry all of this wherever I go. Getting this stuff has been a nightmare. You don’t just walk out to the local shops and buy Kevlar body armour, helmet, or sat-phone. But now it’s done, and I just have to get it all into the three bags I’m taking. Leaving it until the last night was probably a good idea, as leaving my girlfriend Helen has been the hardest thing about this whole plan. It has been particularly hard because of the knowledge that decisions I make affect her life too, and in such a huge way. She’s been fantastic, totally supportive, but it has still been horribly sad getting through these last few days. So while I worried about wasting our last night together, I’m glad I was busy.
My first shock of the trip came quickly, before I had even left the country. I decided to avoid British Airways due to their new extra bag rule, and instead I bought my ticket with Emirites. Checking in, the lady weighed my bags, winced a little, made a face, and then in the chirpiest voice told me that my excess luggage charge was £450. I nearly cried! Welcome to the land of the self-employed. That’s a lot of photographs I need to sell right there.
I arrived in Kabul the next day, and walked off the plane to a beating 25 degrees Celsius, which rose to 28 within a few hours. Then it was on to the chaos that is Kabul International Airport. This was the third time I had to go through this, but it was no easier.
After I extricated myself from that I made my way out to the car park, and happily my driver was there waiting for me. After a few false turns we found my guesthouse, The Gandamack Lodge, which is owned by A Brit, Peter Jouvenal, one of the original Frontline Television Company. The made their name in Afghanistan back during the Soviet war here, and he has never left. Apparently the bug bit him too!
I then spent the rest of the day wandering around Kabul with my driver, and during our exploration I found the British Cemetery. The cemetery is believed to hold over 150 bodies of British soldiers who died in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1840), the occupation of Kabul (1840-1842), and the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1879-1881). When British soldiers once again arrived in Kabul, in 2001, this time as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), they found only 10 headstones remaining, and even they were in a state of decay, and so they were gathered all together and set into the southern wall to form a new monument.
I finished up my last night in reasonable civilization by having a few beers in the bar at The Gandamack. There were a mix of NGO people, journalists, and a few Private Military Company (PMC) guys.
Thursday 12th April
My journey out to Bagram Air Field (BAF) was the usual bone-jarring, high-speed affair. It is unbelievable that in a country that is having so much international aid poured into it can have such bad roads leading in and out of the capital.
Arriving at BAF I had to go through the new security features put in place, following the suicide car bomb attack at the front gate earlier in the year. Once through the gates I was collected by the PAO (Public Affairs Officers) and we went through the whole formal embedding procedure. This involved having my photograph taken in front of US and Afghanistan flags, and signing a lot of paperwork, basically agreeing not to sue the Army if I get blown up, shot, be involved in a helicopter crash, etc. After that, I was run through where I was going first, and then shown to my temporary quarters. Looks just like it did when I left in December. In fact there was a huge feeling of deja-vu as I walked up to the PX (Post Exchange, the shopping area for the military) and over to the D-Fac (dinning facility).
While I was looking around I found the office of two Irish guys I met out here last year. These guys work for a franchise on base, which sells soldiers Harley Davidson motorcycles, and various cars. The idea is that the soldiers get to buy at reduced rates while overseas, and their purchase is built specifically for them. Then it is ready to collect when they get home. It is surprisingly popular, and the guys are kept busy. It was great to know I ave a place to go to talk to people from home, and non-miltary, to give me a break from time to time.
Late into the night I was repacking my gear, as I intended leaving one bag with stuff I shouldn’t need until later in the year. I had a big headache trying to decide whether to bring both sleeping bags with me, as it is very warm here during the day, but as I am going up into the mountains I reckoned it would still be cold at night. In the end I brought both, and jumped on my bag to close it.
Friday 13th April
Now I really feel that I am back in the military world. Up at 5am to get myself and my gear to the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) to catch my flight out to FOB Naray, up in Kunar province, on the Pakistan border. As usual it ws a case of get there early, hang around for ages, and then have a last minute rush to get al my bags into a van that would run us all out to the “bird” that would deliver me to my first step into the frontline. I was flying on a Chinook, and we were going on a “ring-run” which means we were going to touch down at several bases and outposts to move people around, deliver supplies, collect mail, and generally keep the people at these remote places connected to the overall army.
It was a long flight, maybe an hour and a half, with all the stops, before I arrived at my drop off. Flying over Afghanistan like this is amazing, as you get such a great appreciation of the wide-ranging terrain. We flew over wide plains, green with the first flush of spring, and then minutes we were looking down on snow covered mountains. Poppy fields blooming lent huge swathes of pink to the colour scheme, and of course there were lots of dusty brown hills as well.
During the flight I came to appreciate one of the first real benefits of being freelance. While I worked at AFP I was issued with body-armour that was way too big for me, which meant it was extremely uncomfortable to wear. And particularly painful when sitting. As it is inevitable that during an embed you spend long hours sitting in helicopters, Humvees, and other vehicles, this was always a major problem. In Humvees particularly I worried about my safety, as if we had a roll-over, or were hit by an IED (Improvised Explosive Devise) I just didn’t have the mobility to get out in a hurry. And the other fact that I hated was that it was Press-issue blue, with originally a white helmet. Of course, this made me look like a Smurf, and opened me up to much sniggering and smart comments from the soldiers. On a more serious note, it also made me stick out like a sore thumb, which I don’t believe is such a great idea in a conflict where journalists are routinely targeted. I don’t want to wear an army-issue camouflage type either, so I decided to go for an inconspicuous tan, which lots of non-military contractors wear. This has the added benefit of making me more acceptable to soldiers going on foot patrols, as I don’t draw as much attention. There is after all a reason why the military use camouflage. So, my new armour was worth every penny I paid, as I could sit comfortably and even twist and turn to photograph while in my seat. A huge improvement indeed.
Unloading from a helicopter is even more rushed than getting on, as the engines don’t stop, and the challenge of locating your bags amongst all the others strapped down in the middle of the floor and hauling them out and through the downwash of the still whirling rotors is crazy. And all the while the people who are waiting to get on are watching you, which of course means that you are likely to do something stupid, like fall over, when jumping off the rear ramp, which doesn’t quite touch the ground.
My contact, Lt L was there to meet me, and run me though the rules, again. Basically these rules address what I can and can’t photograph, and in fact write about here. They mostly refer to OpSec (Operational Security, which means information which might compromise the security of coalition operations, such as numbers of troop deployment, electronic warfare, etc) and the rigid rule of not photographing, or even interacting with, Special Forces. All journalists know these rules, as they are covered thoroughly during the initial embedding process at BAF, but it is amazing how many journalists break them, either intentionally or through lack of understanding of the situation.
I was shown to where I would be sleeping, another transient tent, and then given a short tour of the small base. The tour consisted of showing me where the front gate was (don’t go outside this alone) and the toilets, showers, laundry, and D-Fac. Unfortunately I had arrived on a Friday, and so there was no hot food today. So I would be onto MREs (Meals Ready to Eat) quicker than I anticipated.
There then followed a series of meetings, which culminated in my sit down chat with Colonel Howard, the Squadron Commanding Officer of 3rd Brigade, 71st Cavalry (hereafter 3/71 Cav), 10th Mountain Division. Much of the talk during these meetings was of “counter-insurgency,” a subject I have been studying for the last few years. There is a lot of discussion going on within the military about counter-insurgency and asymmetric or “fourth generation warfare.” Just to define, we look at the introduction of gunpowder as the marker of modern warfare. The first generation consisted of huge numbers of soldiers with rifles moving in formation, and shooting each other at close range. The objective, and therefore the definition of victory, was simply to destroy the enemy. Think Waterloo. The second generation saw the same concept industrialised, giving us World War I, with machine-guns, artillery, etc. However, the objective remained the same; total annihilation of the enemy’s forces. World War II saw the development of manoeuvre warfare, typified by the German Blitzkrieg. Here the objective was to outmanoeuvre and cut off large numbers of the enemy, thereby rendering them useless and gaining victory.
Forth generation warfare, asymmetric warfare, or insurgency, came of age in Vietnam, although it was used by Mao in China and even earlier in Ireland by Michael Collins and those fighting the War of Independence against the British. The concept here is simple, one force is totally outgunned by another, and so, instead of fighting on an open and conventional battlefield where the outcome is a foregone conclusion, the smaller insurgent force fights in the shadows, carrying out small ambushes on the larger force before melting back into the population. Also common is the murdering of “collaborators” by the insurgents, and a media battle where the insurgents constantly reaffirm the fact that their cause is “right and just.” It is extremely difficult for the larger, conventionally composed and prepared force, to fight this war as the benefits of air superiority, more and better armed troops, and all the other military hardware, is negated by the fact that they cannot find or identify the enemy easily.
The objective of this type of war is not to destroy the enemy, or even to outmanoeuvre him, but to destroy his will to continue to fight. This means making the war protracted, expensive, and most importantly, destroying public and political support at home. Vietnam saw all of these objectives achieved, and stunned the world with the defeat of a super-power by what was seen as a peasant’s army.
Then, exactly the same thing happened in Afghanistan when the Mujahideen defeated the Soviet Army. Of course these wars are far more complicated that that, not least the fact that in both instances the insurgent force had the secret support of a larger, more military advanced country, who provided training, weapons, and finances; China supporting the Viet Cong and the United States giving more than a helping hand to the Mujahideen.
Many experts believe that the problems experienced by the US in Vietnam were compounded by the media, as they were the ones destroying the public’s will at home. However, there is an opposing, albeit smaller, view, that it was in fact the military’s failure to understand and embrace the media that lead to the insurgent’s victory. The infamous “Five O’ Clock follies” in Vietnam, where the media would be told total and provable lies, destroyed the trust that is needed for a healthy relationship between the two.
At Naray, I heard a lot of talk about the need for the Coalition to identify, understand, and react to the fact that they are involved in a classic counter-insurgency. The counter-insurgency concept rests on the fact that in order to defeat an unseen adversary, it is first necessary to cut him off from his support network, that is, the general population. This is what is known as “Winning Hearts and Minds.” Convince the population that their lives will be improved by supporting the conventional force, and at the same time focus their thoughts on the negative acts of the insurgents, such as civilian casualties from their ambushes, IEDs, etc. Once the insurgents lose their support base, or so the theory goes, then they will lose the capability to fight.
And so in Kunar province, I was told, new roads were being built, health clinics funded, and a radio station was providing local media with an outlet to inform the extremely isolated local inhabitants. The major problem with this approach is that it is very slow, and so the insurgents can continue their fight for some time. Plus, the insurgents have some counter tactics of their own.
A tactic common to the “War of the Flea” is to try and draw a massive over reaction from the coalition, from say an ambush in a built up area, which will lead to innocent civilian casualties. The counter-strike will be highlighted by phone-calls, or even video and photos, to the media, which in this age of the 24 hour news cycle, will generally run it before the military has even confirmed that the incident happened.
Part of the problem is that of there are fatalities then the Army insists on 24 hours to inform families, which of course is very important, but it gives the insurgents the initiative. It also means that when an official statement is made, the onus is on the military to convince the public that the information they have already accepted is wrong, or at the very least slanted. Human nature is to believe the first thing we hear, and so overturning that belief is much harder than the original statement. This is an area in which the Coalition must find a balance in order to be effective.
I don’t mean to sound negative. I think it is great that the military recognise the type of fight they are in, as last year I didn’t hear the phrase “counter-insurgency” once. However, the stance of a unit is decided by its commander, and in this case it is obvious that Colonel Howard is the driving force behind the “counter-insurgency” approach. Unfortunately this does not mean it is a belief accepted by all, and judging by the bellicose statements from other commanders in Afghanistan, there are many that still believe all that is needed is to get out there and “bring the fight to the enemy.” Again, nobody is suggesting that counter-insurgency means not to fight, but picking the time and place for those battles can be as much the deciding factors in victory as number of troops and the final body count.
And of course it is important to remember that 10th Mountain have been here since February 2006, and so have had plenty of time to learn lessons. Even with their unexpected 4 month extension on their 12 month deployment, they will soon be leaving, and their replacement, the 82nd Airborne (All-American) Division are already here. The question is, what war will they chose to fight?
